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NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN FOURTH, FIFTH AND SIXTH
AMENDMENT LAW
PANEL
BARBARA BERGMAN*
ARTHUR G. LEFRANCOIS'"
MARIANNE WESSON"
PROFESSOR BERGMAN: My name is Barbara Bergman, I teach at the
University of New Mexico and with me on the panel today are Professor Art
LeFrancois and Professor Mimi Wesson. We have taken the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth
Amendments and divided them up. I am doing the Fourth, Art is doing the Fifth, and
Mimi is doing the Sixth. We will each take about ten to fifteen minutes to talk with
you about what we find most interesting in terms of recent developments, focusing
on what the United States Supreme Court did in the 1998-99 term and the term that
has just ended. Then we will open it up to discussion to talk about issues or
questions that you may have, either involving those cases we touch upon or those
that are of interest to you that we don't talk about in the course of this discussion.
The U.S. Supreme Court this last term had a number of interesting Fourth
Amendment cases. The three cases that I want to mention briefly that came down
this term are the Bond' case, the Wardlow2 case, and the J.L 3 case out of Florida.
Two of these cases, Wardlow and J.L, deal with Terry 4 stop issues. The first one,
the Bond case, deals with a really basic question of whether or not a particular action
by a border patrol agent constitutes a search or not.' In other words, the issue in
Bond was whether or not an individual has a legitimate expectation of privacy in his
luggage on a bus. 6
So let me start with Bond. I'll give you some factual background and then discuss
what the Court held. Bond was a case in which the defendant gets on a bus in
California, heading for Arkansas. When the bus gets to Texas, it is stopped at a
border checkpoint.' A border patrol agent boards to check the immigration status of
the passengers.8 He starts at the front and works his way back. 9 By the time he gets
to the back, he is satisfied that everyone on that bus is legally within the United
States.' 0 He then turns around and starts to walk toward the front of the bus. As he
walks, he reaches into the overhead bin where the passengers' luggage has been
placed, and he is squeezing the bags rather forcefully, as he admitted when he was
being examined at the hearing on the motion to suppress."
* Professor, University of New Mexico School of Law.
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He comes to a particular piece of luggage, gives it a really hard squeeze, and feels
what he describes later as "a brick-like object."' 2 He then asks the individual sitting
beneath that bag, "Is this your bag?" Mr. Bond acknowledges that it's his bag. The
officer asks, "Do you mind if I take a look at it?" (I was always amazed when I used
to be a public defender and my clients would say, "Sure, go ahead and look at my
drugs, that's fine.") Mr. Bond says, "No problem." The officer opens the bag and
finds a brick of methamphetamine, so Mr. Bond is then prosecuted. 3 In the motion
to suppress, Bond argued that this border agent had no reasonable
suspicion--certainly no probable cause-for squeezing this bag, and that the
squeeze itself constituted a search.' 4 The Fifth Circuit said we don't think so.' 5 We
think what the officer did was justified. It didn't constitute a search because the bag
was in public. 6 You put it in the overhead rack, where all kinds of people can touch
it, move it, handle it.' You don't have an expectation of privacy with your luggage
in those circumstances. It's in the public domain, so to speak.'" So the Fifth Circuit
affirmed the conviction.' 9
The U.S. Supreme Court took certiorari, and the issue was whether or not the
agent's action in physically squeezing that bag constituted a search.')Did Mr. Bond
have a legitimate expectation of privacy in his bag when the officer squeezed it?2
The U.S. Supreme Court, in a seven-to-two decision written by Chief Justice
Rehnquist, said that the squeeze constituted a search.' The Court said that the
passenger did have a legitimate expectation of privacy that was violated by this
agent physically squeezing the bag.' Chief Justice Rehnquist drew a distinction
between a visual inspection and a tactile inspection, which he explained was more
exploratory in nature and therefore more physically intrusive than other kinds of
inspections that had been upheld.' The majority said the agent went too far. This
was a search, and the agent didn't have any reasonable justification for that search.
On that basis, the Court threw out the methamphetamine and overturned the
conviction. 25
There was a dissent by Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Scalia, where Justice
Breyer seems to be wondering if anyone in the majority had traveled on an airplane
recently.26 Has anybody watched what happens to your luggage in those overhead
bins? Have you ever seen some of the flight attendants take the bags and shove and
push and do all kinds of things to them? If so, then how could passengers on public
transportation these days legitimately expect that this sort of thing would not happen
12.
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to their luggage? 2 The dissenters would have said that this did not constitute a
search, because there was no legitimate expectation of privacy.28
The next two cases are Terry v. Ohio cases, and they raise issues that have been
the source of much litigation. I'm not sure, however, how much the Wardlow case
is going to help anyone figure out whether running away from the police in a high
crime area is enough to constitute reasonable suspicion or not. In Wardlow a caravan
of police, about four vehicles, go into a high crime, high drug area.29 Officers in the
last vehicle did the search in question. (Interestingly, at the motion to suppress, the
officer who testified couldn't remember whether he was in a marked or unmarked
vehicle.) Basically when they pull into this area, a man who is holding an opaque
bag sees them, makes eye contact, and takes off running." The officers go after him.
They stop him, pat down the bag, and find a gun. 3
The defense moved to suppress the gun and the question on appeal was whether
"unprovoked flight," as the state of Illinois calls it, in a high crime area constitutes
sufficient reasonable suspicion for a Terry stop and frisk.3 2 That issue was left
somewhat up in the air in the HodariD.33 case from a couple of terms ago. Justice
Scalia had indicated that he would have liked to have addressed that issue in Hodari
D., but the state had not chosen to argue that mere flight alone was enough to justify
a Terry stop. 34 So it was no surprise a couple of terms later, when this case came
along, that the Court took certiorari to resolve the question.
Both sides wanted the Court to adopt a per se rule. Illinois argued that there
should be a per se rule that when someone runs away in a high crime area from a
police officer, it's unprovoked flight, and that should be enough for a stop and
frisk. 35 The defense argued that there can be all sorts of reasons why people might
a per se
not want to have a discussion with police officers, so the defense wanted
36
rule that mere flight alone should never be enough for a Terry stop.
All nine justices said we're not giving you a per se rule. A per se rule doesn't
work here. When applying Terry v. Ohio, you look to the totality of the
circumstances. You have to look at all of the factors surrounding what was going on
in a particular case. You have to exercise good judgment and common sense and
draw logical inferences, and that's how we decide there's reasonable suspicion.
They all agreed on that.
What I find interesting about Wardlow is they all agreed that's what you do, then
five of them took the record of the case and said, we think there's enough here,37 and

27. Id
28. Id at 343.
29. Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 121 (2000).
30. Id at 122.
31. id.
32. Id. at 126 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
33. California v. Hodari D, 499 U.S. 621 (1991).
34. Id at 624, n. 1. The state in that case had conceded that the officer did not have reasonable suspicion
to conduct a search based on flight alone. Id.
35. Wardlow, 528 U.S. at 126 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
36. Id.
37. Id. at 121-26 (Rehnquist, J., writing for the majority with Kennedy, O'Connor, Scalia, and Thomas, JJ.,
joining).
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four of them took the same record and said, no, not enough. a So from a practical
standpoint I think the opinion demonstrates the tremendous difficulty in looking at
this sort of record and making that kind of judgment. Obviously, here we had nine
justices with a close split on the application of the facts to the law. But clearly the
standard is totality of the circumstances. The analysis is very fact-based, very much
looking at the specific circumstances of every case.
The third case is Floridav. J.L. It's another Terry case-an anonymous tip case.
Police receive a tip saying there's a young black male at a particular location,
wearing a plaid shirt and oh, by the way, he's got a gun.39 Within six minutes of that
call being dispatched, the officers arrive at the location and they see three young
black males at this bus stop area "hanging around," according to the officers'
description.' They see nothing in terms of the behavior of these individuals,
including the young man wearing the plaid shirt, that would indicate criminal
activity.4 '
They go up to the fellow in the plaid shirt, they stop him, and they pat him down
and find a gun.42 So the question is whether or not the anonymous tip, with no
confirming evidence of criminal activity, is enough to justify a Terry stop.43 The
U.S. Supreme Court, in a unanimous decision written by Justice Ginsburg, said it
wasn't enough." The Court explained that, standing alone, the corroborating
evidence, such as the information in the tip such as the clothing, the race, and the
location, confirmed nothing except clothing, race and location.4" The police had no
indication of any additional criminal activity. So the Court said you have to have
something to indicate that the allegation of illegal activity is reliable.46
Justice Kennedy wrote a concurring opinion, joined by Justice Rehnquist,
pointing out that there are all kinds of things we could look to in order to evaluate
the reliability of the anonymous tip.47 We have Caller ID,48 we have maybe a caller
who's called on numerous occasions and the person taking the call recognizes the
voice and knows they've gotten reliable information in the past, even though they
don't know the caller's name. There are all kinds of other factors that could be
considered. But on the facts of this case, that's not enough.4 9 So Kennedy and
Rehnquist said there was no reasonable suspicion. 0
One of the arguments that had been raised was the question of a possible firearm
exception.5 The argument was that when you get a tip about a gun, because guns
are so dangerous and there is so much concern about controlling them, the
38. Id. at 125-40 (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part with Breyer, Ginsburg, and Souter,
J.J., joining).
39. Florida v. LL, 529 U.S. 266, 268 (2000).

40. Id.
41.

Id.

42. Id.
43. Id.
44. iL, 529 U.S. at 268.
45.

Id. at 271-72.

46. Id.
47. Id. at 274-75 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
48. Caller ID, also known as Calling Number Display, provides a digital display attachment to telephones
that identifies the name and phone number of a caller.
49. J.L, 529 U.S. at 274.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 272.
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anonymous tip ought to be enough.5 2 The Supreme Court clearly said it was not
creating a firearm exception under Terry.53 The Court said it would look to all
relevant factors, not just the fact that the tip mentioned the presence of a gun. If the
tip is not sufficiently reliable, that's it, and it doesn't matter that the tip is about a
gun. Justice Ginsburg said the gun exception argument would lead to a slippery
slope, because there is also an argument that drug dealers often have guns and are
armed.' So, if you have a tip about drugs, does that mean, therefore, that you must
incorporate by inference that there might be a gun involved and therefore that is
enough? Ginsburg said the Court wasn't going
there. The Court was not going to
5
carve out that kind of exception under Terry.
So those are the three cases that have come down during the 1999-2000 term on
the Fourth Amendment that I find of most interest. There are three cases pending
before the Supreme Court next term raising Fourth Amendment issues. Not all of
them in a criminal context-one is a civil lawsuit-but all of them implicate the
interpretation of the Fourth Amendment.
One is City of Indianapolis v. Edmond.5" This is a case where the city of
Indianapolis had in place drug checkpoints.57 They would set up these drug
checkpoints and they would stop every car that came along, ask for a driver's license
and proof of insurance, and then they had a drug dog walk around the car. 8 If the
dog alerted them, they went further. If the dog did not alert them and everything else
checked out, the person went on their way. 59 Basically these stops lasted less than
five minutes, unless there was reason to keep someone longer. 6° It had a
tremendously successful rate of arrests. The result was that 9.4% of the people
stopped were arrested either for drugs or for some other violation, mostly traffic
violations.6 1 In other words, it was a very effective program. In fact, in a dissent to
the Seventh Circuit opinion, Judge Easterbrook emphasized that this was a great
program that had really worked.62
The problem was that there was no individualized suspicion, 63 and Indianapolis
candidly acknowledged that the primary purpose of the checkpoint was law
enforcement." It was crime detection. It was not for safe driving. They weren't
trying to get people high on drugs off the streets so they wouldn't be driving. They
wanted to get people with drugs off the streets because they were criminals. So the
record I think is a good record in the sense that they didn't make any bones about
52. See id.
53. Id.
54. Id. at 272-73.
55. J.L, 529 U.S. at 273.
56. City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. 32, 121 S. Ct. 447 (2000). At the time Professor Bergman gave
this presentation, the Supreme Court had not yet decided this case. In a five-to-four majority, written by Justice
O'Connor, the court affirmed the decision of the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals, Edmond v. Goldsmith, 183 F.3d
659 (7th Cit. 1999), finding that checkpoints established primarily for crime detection purposes, and not based on
individualized suspicion, violated the Fourth Amendment.
57. Edmond, 531 U.S. at_, 120 S.Ct. at 450.
58.
59.

Id. at-,
id. at -,

60.
61.
62.
63.

id.
Edmond v. Goldsmith, 183 F.3d at 666.
Id. at 666-71 (Easterbrook, J. dissenting).
City of Indianapolis v. Edmond, 531 U.S. -,

64. Id. at

120 S.Ct. at450-51.
120 S.Ct. at 451.

, 121 S.Ct. at453.

121 S.Ct. at 451,455.
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the fact that these checkpoints were for crime detection and drug investigation. It
was different than other kinds of checkpoints, where the purpose is to get drunk
drivers off the street or address other public safety concerns by checking for licenses
and that sort of thing. So this case presented this issue very clearly for the Court to
decide.6 5
The Court just granted certiorari on the Atwater6" case this week.67 The Atwater
case is the soccer mom case, although I know Art doesn't think she is a true soccer
mom because she is driving around without a seatbelt and the children are not
wearing seatbelts. 6' But the record shows she's come back from soccer practice with
her children and this officer pulls her over for a seatbelt violation-failure to have
the children in seatbelts. 69 Her purse had been stolen a week or so before and the
thieves had taken her driver's license and proof of insurance. So she didn't have that
on her, and the officer cited her for that, too.7" He took her out of the car, handcuffed
her, placed her under arrest, called for backup-because, you know, soccer moms
can be dangerous-transported her down and locked her up for an hour.7" The
magistrate let her out rather quickly and dismissed the case. 2 There was reason to
believe that this particular officer had some animosity toward this lady-we're not
quite sure why-because he'd pulled her over a few weeks before thinking she
wasn't wearing a seatbelt, but she was. 73 So when he checked her license, he knew
she had a valid license and insurance because he had stopped her two weeks
before.74 Then he stops her this day and places her under arrest. She's suing
everybody-the police officer, the city, everybody 7 5 -and the Supreme Court took
certiorari.76 The issue that this raises is whether the Fourth Amendment, by
ihcorporating the common law as it existed at the time the Fourth Amendment was
framed, prohibits as an unreasonable seizure the warrantless, full custodial arrest of
an individual for a fine-only criminal misdemeanor-a fifty dollar fine is the
maximum here-that does not involve a breach of the peace.77 That was the
common law.78

65. E.g., Michigan Dep't of State Police v. Silz, 496 U.S. 444 (1990); United States v. Martinez-Fuerte, 428
U.S. 543 (1976).
66. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 195 F.3d 242 (5th Cir. 1999).
67. The Supreme Court granted certiorari in Atwater v. City ofLago Vista on June 26, 2000, 120 S.C. 2715
(June 26,2000). The case was decided on June 18, 2001. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, No. 99-1408, 2001 WL
672595 (June 18,2001).
68. Atwater, 195 F.3d at 244.
69. Id.
70. Id. at 248 (Wiener, J. dissenting).
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 195 F.3d 242, 248 (5th Cir. 1999) (Wiener, J. dissenting).
74. Id.

75. Id. at 244.
76. Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 195 F.3d 242 (5th Cir. 1999), cert. granted 120 S.Ct. 2715 (June 26,

2000).
77. The plaintiff, Ms. Atwater, raised this issue when the case was heard en banc before the Fifth Circuit
Court of Appeals, but the court did not consider that argument because it had not been raised during the trial or
before the three-judge panel that heard the frst appeal. Atwater, 195 F.3d at 245 n.3.

78. Id.
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The Supreme Court granted certiorari a couple of terms ago in Ricci v. Arlington
Heights79 because the justices thought this issue was presented in that case. It
became clear in oral argument that the same issue was not presented in as good a
fashion as they wanted, so they dismissed certiorari as improvidently granted." This
case, the Atwater case, re-raises the issue, and I think properly so. I think we're
going to get a decision on that issue.
The Ferguson8' case I will just mention in passing. A nurse in South Carolina was
concerned about the birth of crack-addicted babies. 2 So she began working with the
hospital and prosecutors. They came up with a program under which the hospital
would test the urine of pregnant women who showed indicia of cocaine use. 3 If the
women tested positive, they were given a choice of participating in a drug treatment
program, or the hospital would turn the evidence over to the police for prosecution, 8'
because in South Carolina, in state court, ingestion of drugs had been found to
constitute the crime of contributing to the delinquency of a minor.85 In that state the
fetus was viewed as a living being, and it clearly was under eighteen, and therefore
it was a minor for purposes of that statute." So there was a basis for criminal
prosecution. The question is whether that program violates the Fourth Amendment.87
One of the patients brought a civil lawsuit on a number of grounds, including the
Fourth Amendment. Now I'll turn it over to Art for the Fifth Amendment.
PROFESSOR LEFRANCOIS: The Court decided several Fifth Amendment cases
this term. I'd like to devote my time now to discussing the most publicized one. I
hope you're not tired of hearing about it by now. I'll be happy to discuss the other
cases later in this session, if anyone would like.
88
On Monday, the Court announced its decision in Dickerson v. United States.
This was the case that raised the issue of whether the Court would overturn its 1966
Miranda9 decision---or rule that Congress already had--or not. The Court decided
seven to two for the "or not." That is, it determined that Congress, for lack of
authority, had not overturned Miranda,90 and that the Court didn't want to, either. 9'
This made Justice Scalia very mad. He dissented, joined by Justice Thomas. Justice
Rehnquist, of all people, wrote the majority opinion.

79. Ricci v. Arlington Heights, 116 F.3d 288 (7th Cir. 1997), cert. granted, 522 U.S. 1038, cert. dismissed,
523 U.S. 613 (1998).
80. 523 U.S. 613 (1998).
81. Ferguson v. City of Charleston, 186 F.3d 469 (4th Cir. 1999), cert. granted, 120 S.Ct. 1239 (February
28, 2000). The case was decided on March 21, 2001. See Ferguson v. City of Charleston, _ U.S. _ 121 S. Ct
1281 (2001).
82. Ferguson, 186 F.3d.at 474.
83. Id.
84. Id.
85. See State v. Home, 319 S.E.2d 703, 704 (S.C. 1984) (holding that a viable fetus was a person within the
meaning of South Carolina law); Whitner v. State, 492 S.E. 2d 777, 778-84 (S.C. 1997) (upholding criminal
conviction for child neglect in a case in which a woman ingested cocaine while pregnant).
86. S.C. CODE ANN. § 44-53-440 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1997).
87. Ferguson, 186 F.3d at 473.
88. Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428 (2000). The Dickerson opinion was announced Monday, June
26, 2000.
89. Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
90. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 435-43.
91. Id. at 443.
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You all know that Mirandasays that before a person is custodially interrogated,
she must be warned of her right to remain silent, that anything she says can be used
against her, that she has a right to the presence of an attorney, and that an attorney
will be provided even if she can't afford one. 92
This is all peachy, but Mirandais less than transparent on its source of authority.
At the time Miranda was decided, the law required that confessions be suppressed
if they were involuntary. This started out as a common law rule,93 was later unevenly
incarnated as a Fifth Amendment rule,' and then morphed into a due process rule. 95
But it all amounted to the same thing-the test for the admissibility of confessions
was voluntariness.
The MirandaCourt wasn't satisfied with this, so it said that because interrogation
techniques had gotten so sophisticated, a rule more protective of Fifth Amendment
rights was needed. 9' This is where the biggest challenge to Miranda became
Miranda. The case said the warnings were required, but only in the absence of
equally protective alternatives-other safeguards that adequately protected the right
to silence and its continuous exercise.' After all, the Court didn't mean for the case
to be construed as a "constitutional straitjacket." If the Court didn't mean to
impose a constitutional straitjacket on Congress and the states, then why, and how,
was it applying its newly fashioned rule-Justice Scalia calls it the "Miranda
code" 9 9-to three states in one day?W
As we say in Oklahoma, what's the deal? The deal, we were told eight years later
in a case called Michigan v. Tucker, was that Mirandawas a rule that was protective
of the Fifth Amendment right against self-incrimination, but not protected by it.10'
Mirandasafeguarded the Constitution, but was not required by it. Mirandawas sort
of transconstitutional law.
There would have been nothing terribly odd about this, had such a rule applied
only to federal courts. We all might have thought the Court was exercising its
supervisory power over the lower federal courts."° But there was the pesky fact that
the Court insisted on the Miranda rule in case after case coming from state courts,
and also in habeas corpus cases that raised constitutional issues. 0 3 How could a
nonconstitutional prophylactic rule bind the states, or raise cognizable constitutional
issues on habeas?

92.

Miranda, 384 U.S. at 479.

93.
94.
95.
96.

Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574(1884).
Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532 (1897).
Brown v. Mississippi, 297 U.S. 278 (1936).
In 1964, the Court had determined that the Fifth Amendment applied to the states. Malloy v. Hogan, 378

U.S. 1(1964).
97. Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467,479.
98. Id. at 467.

99. Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 456 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
100. Miranda and two of its companion cases applied the nle to state courts. See Miranda, 384 U.S. at 49194, 497-99.

101. Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 444,446 (characterizing the "prophylactic standards" established in
Miranda as "not.. .protected by the Constitution.").
102. See Carlisle v. United States, 517 U.S. 416, 425-26 (1996) (recognizing power of federal courts to
prescribe rules of procedure required by neither Congress nor Constitution).
103. See Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 439 n. 3 (seeking to demonstrate Miranda's constitutional status by citing
habeas cases allowing Miranda claims).
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As if things weren't interesting enough, two years after Miranda was decided,
Congress passed a law, 18 U.S.C. § 3501, that sought to return the matter of
confession admissibility to the pre-Mirandavoluntariness standard. Nearly everyone
but Justice Scalia ignored this statute on the theory that it was an illegitimate
usurpation of the Court's function-because it sought to overturn a constitutional
rule. This made sense, except that Miranda questioned its own constitutional
legitimacy, and the Court in case after case began holding that Miranda'swarnings
were something other than constitutionally required. To some, it seemed the Court's
usurpation of Congress's authority trumped Congress's legitimate attempt to reassert
its authority. Justice Scalia says the Court, at least in Dickerson, used a power it
doesn't have.' 4
Section 3501, as I've suggested, had nearly no friends. Seven presidential
administrations, including President Nixon's, essentially ignored it. Professional law
enforcement associations lauded Miranda.The only stinging attacks were launched
by liberals, who suggested that, without Miranda, we might devise a better
alternative. But then the activist Warren Court-long after its demise-met its
match in the conservative activism of the Fourth Circuit. That Court of Appeals
chided the Department of Justice, in Dickerson, for ignoring § 3501 and thus for
putting politics higher than law.' 05 Such an abnegation of duty, however, would not
keep the appellate court from its appointed rounds. The Fourth Circuit had the aid
of Professor Paul Cassell'-one of the lonely friends of § 3501-who briefed the
§ 3501 issue because neither of the parties raised it and was given time for oral
argument as well. With all of this, the Fourth Circuit held that Miranda was not
required by the Constitution, that Congress could therefore legislatively overturn it,
and that Mr. Dickerson's statement made without Mirandawarnings was admissible
because it was voluntary under § 3501."7 A conservative court had-it seemedoverruled the Supreme Court.
One neat aspect of the case is that Dickerson most likely was given the warnings
prior to his confession-he signed a memo to this effect," 8 but no one really cares.
The district court applied a rule of federal civil procedure to show how little it cared
for the government's efforts to get this tidbit of evidence in."' The government
failed to try to introduce this evidence in its initial response to Mr. Dickerson's
suppression motion, to show how little it cared about this evidentiary morsel."0
Professor Cassell was quoted as saying this was a perfect case for his § 3501
argument, since there was no Miranda violation."' Anyway, the Fourth Circuit was
sort of right. The Supreme Court has held that there is a public safety exception to
Miranda,"2 that fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree analysis doesn't apply to Miranda

104.
105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

Id. at 2337 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
United States v. Dickerson, 166 F. 3d 667, 672 (4th Cir.1999).
Professor of Law, University of Utah.
Dickerson, 166 F.3d at 687-92.
Id. at 677.
Id.
Id at 679.
Roger Parloff, Miranda on the Hot Seat, NEW YORK TIMES MAGAZINE, Sept. 26, 1999, at 84, 87.
New York v. Quarles, 467 U.S. 649, 654(1984).
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4
violations, 13 and that Miranda-violativestatements may be used to impeach." The
Court decided all this on the quite express theory that Miranda violations aren't
constitutional violations.
So the Fourth Circuit put the Supreme Court in a neat box. To find that § 3501
impermissibly overturns a Supreme Court holding, the Court would have to find that
Miranda warnings are required by the Constitution. But if the Court so held, it
would have to disown all of Miranda'sprogeny that depend on the warnings being
merely prophylactic, and not constitutionally required at all. On the other hand, if
the Court found § 3501 to be a legitimate exercise of Congress's authority to
promulgate rules of procedure and evidence for the courts, it would have to say
goodbye to the entire edifice constructed by Miranda.What was the Court to do?
I told my classes this year that the Court would not overturn Mirandaon its own,
or through the § 3501 route, because Miranda is the only criminal law case
Americans have heard of. Put more politely, its symbolic meaning is too great. I
think I was right. Perhaps the Court was, too. The opinion is an exercise in practical
wisdom, but it's a bit hard to defend as a matter of law.
Justice Rehnquist's opinion for the Court locates itself in a sort of twilight world,
where there are congressionally untouchable, Supreme Court-mandated,
constitutional holdings that aren't, well, exactly required by the Constitution. What's
the proof that Miranda is a constitutional rule? Well, there's the fact that the Court
applies it to the states.' In a passage of considerable subtlety, the majority says that
its invitation in Miranda to Congress and the states to fashion an alternative
safeguard of the Fifth Amendment right underscores the "constitutional basis" of the
6

case. 11

What about the cases that say because the rule is not constitutionally compelled,
it's okay to impeach defendants with Miranda-violative statements, that there's a
public safety exception to the rule, and that fruit-of-the-poisonous-tree analysis
doesn't apply?" 7 This just shows the mutability of constitutional rules, says the
opinion." 8 And § 3501? Here, the Court says, correctly, that this was not an effort
to provide an equally protective safeguard of the underlying constitutional right; it
was instead an effort to simply return the law to its pre-Mirandastatus." 9 Finally,
the Court says that, as a matter of stare decisis, there is no special justification for
abandoning Miranda,and that subsequent cases have not undermined its doctrinal
underpinnings." 2 The Court said this last part, insofar as one can tell, with a straight
face. (Maybe that's because Mirandahad no doctrinal underpinnings.) Put simply,
the warnings are part of our "national culture."'' Finally, the warnings regime is
more workable than its voluntariness predecessor.'2 2

113.
114.
115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433, 446-48 (1974); Oregon v. Elstad, 470 U.S. 298, 308 (1985).
Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225-26 (1971); Oregon v. Haas, 420 U.S. 714, 722-23 (1975).
Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 438-39.
Id. at440.
See supra text accompanying notes 112-14.
Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 441.
id.
Id. at443.
Id.
Id.
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So, the rule is constitutional-whatever that means. Therefore, Congress cannot
overturn it, and since stare decisis counsels against the Court abandoning it, the
Fourth Circuit judgment is reversed.
Justice Scalia, in a typically excoriating dissent, accuses the Court of
contravening an obscure case called Marbury v. Madison." Dickerson, he says,
changes Miranda (which pretended, he claims, to be constitutionally required) into
a "Sphinx... ofjudicial arrogance" by dropping the pretense."2 ' Ordinarily, the kind
of tempest created by the Dickerson dissent is easily avoided. The majority would
claim the Constitution requires the rule it favors; the dissent would claim it doesn't.
The majority in Dickerson, however, may have been foreclosed from such discourse
because three of its members had written or joined in opinions that depended upon
the nonconstitutional status of Miranda.2 5
The case does strain notions of separation of powers and federalism. It strains
separation of powers because it says the Court can prevent Congress from enacting
legislation that seeks to overturn Court-made rules that are not themselves required
by the Constitution. It strains federalism because it says the Court can compel the
states to abide by Court-made rules that are not themselves required by the
Constitution. It is completely unsurprising that these tensions and antinomies have
come home to roost, born as they were in an opinion constitutionally at odds with
itself. After all, the real meaning of Miranda-theCourt says as much there-is
that, not only does the Fifth Amendment not require Miranda, Miranda doesn't
require Miranda. "
Finally, it's worth noting that the Court refuses to hold that "nothing else will
suffice" to satisfy the requirements of the Fifth Amendment.'27 It's the old refrain
from Miranda.But my bet is no one's going to try to fashion an alternate safeguard.
Justice Scalia, for one, won't need one. He will continue to apply § 3501 until it is
repealed.' 2'
But we can look for defendants to press for an overturning of the cases that allow
Miranda-violativestatements to impeach, that create a public safety exception to the
warnings, and that hold that poisonous fruit analysis is 'not applicable to Miranda
violations. Perhaps litigants outside the Fifth Amendment context will press for
more prophylactic rules that exceed the scope of other constitutional provisions as
well. If either happens, the Court will have the opportunity to explain more fully the
nature of a constitutional rule that is the result of the Constitution requiring
something, but not necessarily the rule at issue. The Court has yet to explain what's
special about Mirandaand its curious progeny. Dickerson, that is, underscores the
enigma of a constitutionally based rule requiring only something as good as itself
to protect a constitutional right that does not in turn require the rule.
PROFESSOR MiMI WESSON: I'm not going to talk about all of the aspects of
the Sixth Amendment that we might want to discuss because there is not enough
123. Id. at 2337 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 2 L Ed. 60

(1803)).
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Dickerson, 530 U.S. at 465 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See id., 530 U.S. at 445 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
See supra notes 97-100 and accompanying text.
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Id. at 465 (Scalia, J., dissenting).
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time. So I chose one aspect for my focus-the Confrontation Clause. There will be
a quiz at the end of this time.
The most important Confrontation Clause case decided by the United States
Supreme Court since you last met as ajudicial conference is Lilly v. Virginia.'2 9 Lilly
v. Virginia raises a question that has troubled the Court from time to time and to
which it has given a series of not altogether consistent answers. The question is,
What exactly is the relationship between the Confrontation Clause of the Sixth
Amendment and the hearsay rule? Now, we know that the hearsay rule and the
Confrontation Clause are not identical and that they don't require exactly the same
things. One reason we know this is that the Court keeps telling us. The Court said
back in 1970, in California v. Green,' 3 that the Confrontation Clause does not
represent a codification of the rules of hearsay. 3' The Court has since reiterated that
principle several times.'32 In addition, we can think of certain kinds of cases in
which the Confrontation Clause would be offended but the hearsay rule would not,
or vice versa. One example is posed by a situation
that was the subject of the Court's
33
attention in 1989 in a case called Coy v. Iowa.1
In Coy, the trial judge was concerned about a child-victim-witness and the child's
experience of having to testify while gazing into the eyes of that child's alleged
molester. The trial judge agreed to the prosecution's request to erect a screen
between the defendant and witness so the child could testify but would not be able
to see the defendant sitting at the defense table.1' Apparently, the screen was one-'
way so the defendant could see the child-witness. This stratagem was apparently
successful enough that the
child testified, the jury believed the child, and the
35
defendant was convicted.1
When Mr. Coy took his conviction to the United State Supreme Court, the Court
held in a curious opinion by Justice Scalia, who's ordinarily not a great friend of the
rights of criminal defendants, that the trial judge's use of the screen violated the
defendant's right to confront the witness. 36 So there is a case in which there
couldn't be any hearsay violation, because the accuser did testify under oath and was
subject to cross-examination, but according to the Court there was a Confrontation
Clause violation.
Also, there are Confrontation Clause violations that consist of some restriction
imposed by the trial judge on the cross-examination of a testifying witness. For
example, in a 1974 case, Davis v. Alaska, 37 one of the prosecution witnesses who3
testified against the defendant had been in trouble with the law as a juvenile.1 1
Counsel wanted to cross-examine him about his juvenile record, but the trial court
prohibited the cross-examination because an Alaska statute made juvenile

129. Lilly v. Virginia, 527 U.S. 116(1999).
130. California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149 (1970).
131. Id. at 155.
132. See, e.g., Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990).

133. Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012 (1988).
134. Id. at 1014-15.
135. Id. at 1015.

136. Id. at 1020-21.
137. Davis v. Alaska, 415 U.S. 308 (1974).
138. Id. at311.
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convictions confidential. 3 9 The defendant was convicted, and the United States
Supreme Court said his right to confrontation had been violated."4 So once again,
there was no hearsay violation, because the witness had testified under oath, but
there was a violation of the Confrontation Clause.
Then, just to consider the converse situation, we can think of cases in which there
would be a violation of the hearsay rule, but not of the Confrontation Clause.
Obviously, in any civil case the employment of hearsay without conformity to some
hearsay exception would violate the hearsay rule, but the Confrontation Clause
could not be violated in a civil case. But even if you focus on prosecution evidence
in criminal cases, the situation comes up fairly often in which the prosecution wants
to use an out-of-court statement as part of its evidence against the defendant, and the
out-of-court statement for some reason is admitted even though it does not conform
to some exception to the hearsay rule. So we have a violation of the hearsay rule.
But then, suppose the out-of-court declarant later takes the stand as a witness-takes
an oath, testifies and is subject to cross-examination. Under those circumstances, the
Court has held that there is not a violation of the Confrontation Clause because the
defendant, although he might not have had a chance to cross examine the witness
at the time he made the out-of-court declaration, did have the opportunity to cross
a witness-and the Confrontation Clause
examine later when the declarant became
41
circumstance.'
that
by
was satisfied
So we know, because the courts have told us, and also because of these examples
that I rehearsed at perhaps too great length, that there's not a perfect identity
between the Confrontation Clause and its requirements and the hearsay rule and its
requirements. On the other hand, the Supreme Court seems to be, brick by brick,
building a structure of identity or near identity between the requirements of the
Confrontation Clause (leaving behind these unusual cases that I just mentioned) and
the traditional hearsay rule, coupled with its traditional, or as the Court calls them
'firmly rooted," exceptions. Lilly v. Virginia represents another step in the Court's
march toward a not perfect but very powerful identification between the
requirements of the Confrontation Clause and those of the hearsay rule. So I'll just
say a little bit about Lilly, and then after this there really is going to be a quiz. You
guys sleeping in the back row better look lively now.
To really understand Lilly, you have to understand a case the Court decided about
142
five years before, in 1994, called Williamson v. United States. Williamson was a
federal criminal prosecution and in that case, as in Lilly, the defendant was
4
unfortunate enough to have a chatty accomplice. That is, both Mr. Williamson and
Mr. Lilly carried out a crime with the aid of someone else.'" In each case one of the
139. Id. At the time, Alaska Rule of Children's Procedure 23 provided that "No adjudication, order, or
disposition of a juvenile case shall be admissible in a court not acting in the exercise of juvenile jurisdiction except

for use in a presentencing procedure in a criminal case where the superior court, in its discretion, determines that
such use is appropriate." Alaska Stat. § 47.10.080 (g) (1971), repealed by §55 ch 59 SLA 1996, provided that "The
commitment and placement of a child and evidence given in the court are not admissible as evidence against the
minor in a subsequent case or proceedings in any other court...."
140. Davis, 415 U.S. at 317-18.
141. E.g., United States v. Owens, 484 U.S. 554, 559 (1988) (holding that witness's out-of-court statement
is admissible even though witness no longer remembers incident in question).
142. Williamson v. United States, 512 U.S. 594 (1994).
143. See Williamson, 512 U.S. at 596; Lilly, 527 U.S. at 120-21.
144. See supranote 143.
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accomplices was apprehended, warned, questioned and confessed to a slight
involvement with the crime. But these accomplices also said the other guy was the
real kingpin-in the Williamson case, Mr. Williamson, and the Lilly case,* Mr.
Lilly.'45 Actually, in the Lilly case, the out-of-court declarant was Mr. Lilly's
brother,'" so it was one Lilly saying it was the other Lilly who did the really bad
stuff. In each of these cases, the prosecution sought to use the confessing
accomplice's out-of-court statement as part of its evidence against the defendant
later at trial, and employed an argument that the hearsay rule was not offended
because of the traditionally recognized exception for statements against interest. ""
It's important that in each of these cases the out-of-court declarant later clammed up
and claimed a privilege against self-incrimination, and so was not available as a
witness. 4
Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b)(3), which has equivalents in various states,
provides that in the case of an unavailable declarant, an out-of-court statement that
is adverse to the penal interest of the declarant is admissible as an exception to the
hearsay rule."' 9 In Williamson, a federal criminal case, the Court was just
interpreting this rule."' It didn't have to reach the Confrontation Clause question,
because it found that the prosecution's argument for admissibility was wrong and
the trial judge was wrong to accept it.151 The Court found that an out-of-court
statement by one who says, "Yeah, I had a little bit to do with this crime, but mostly
it was the other guy who did it," is not sufficiently against the penal interest of the
declarant at the time to satisfy the exception to the hearsay rule for statements
against interest. 5 2 So that's Williamson.
Now, along comes Lilly v. Virginia. The case is very similar, but begins with a
trial in state court. 53 So the Virginia judge is looking at the Virginia version of the
declaration against interest exception to the hearsay rule and interprets it a little
more expansively than the Supreme Court had interpreted the federal version in
Williamson.15" The trial court in fact says that the Virginia version is expansive
enough to accommodate an out-of-court statement made by an accomplice who
implicates both himself and the accused in the course of the same statement.'5' The
case goes up to the Virginia Supreme Court, which affirms Mr. Lilly's conviction
and says that it finds that his accomplice/brother's out-of-court statement, in
addition to satisfying the hearsay exception, was particularly reliable under the
circumstances. 6
Now, that finding of reliability is important because in the U.S. Supreme Court's
evolution of the Confrontation Clause, it has said that there are really two ways to
satisfy the demands of the Confrontation Clause when the prosecution seeks to use
145. Lilly. 527 U.S. at 120-21.

146. Id.
147.
148.

Williamson, 512 U.S. at 597-98; Lilly, 527 U.S. at 121.
Williamson, 512 U.S. at 597; Lilly 527 U.S. at 121.

149. FED. R.EVID. 804(b).
150.
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Williamson, 512 U.S. at 598-99.
Id at599-600.
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Lilly, 527 U.S. at 121.
See id. at 122; Lilly v. Commonwealth, 499 S.E.2d 522, 534 (Va. 1998).

155. See supra note 154.

156. Lilly, 499 S.E.2d at 534.
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an out-of-court statement against the defendant. One is to prove that the out-of-court
statement satisfies one of the firmly rooted exceptions to the hearsay rule.' The
other is to prove that despite its failure to satisfy one of the exceptions, the statement
is inherently reliable.'58 So the Virginia Supreme Court sought, I believe, to sew up
this conviction against the possibility of being overturned in federal court by finding
both that the Virginia hearsay exception had been satisfied and that the statement
was particularly reliable. Just to make matters a little bit more air tight, the Virginia
Supreme Court examined the question of whether this exception to the Virginia
59
hearsay rule was firmly rooted and said that it was.'
So the case gets to the United States Supreme Court. Now the justices of the
United States Supreme Court can't exactly tell the Virginia judges that they were
wrong about the meaning of the Virginia hearsay rule because that's a matter of state
law and the Virginia judges are the final authority on that. So they have to reach the
Confrontation Clause question. When they do, they first discuss their decision in
Williamson, although noting that it was an interpretation of a Federal Rule of
Evidence."W They acknowledge that a state is entitled to have different rules of
evidence, and different exceptions or more expansive exceptions to the hearsay rule
than the federal courts.' 6 ' But then they go on to find that this Virginia exception is
not, contrary to the Virginia Supreme Court's conclusion, a firmly rooted exception
to the hearsay rule. 62 They say Virginia really hasn't had the exception all that long
3
and hasn't really applied it all that many times. 6 They also contradict the Virginia
Supreme Court's decision that this out-of-court statement was particularly
reliable.'" They say there's nothing reliable about a guy who tries to wriggle out
from under his share of responsibility for a crime by shoving some of the blame onto
someone else, even if it is his brother. 65 So, they find that Mr. Lilly's confrontation
rights, under the circumstances, were violated."'
There's a very interesting concurring opinion by Justice Breyer in which he
questions the Court's evolving interpretation of the hearsay rules in a manner that
seems to link them so securely with the Confrontation Clause. He suggests that
this question.' 67
maybe the Court might have taken a wrong turn and should revisit
Even more emphatically there are concurring opinions by Justices Scalia and
Thomas, taking one of their characteristic original intent stances and suggesting that
the Court took a wrong turn a very long time ago and should go back about 150
68
years and reconstitute the Confrontation Clause as it was originally intended.
So, with all of that in mind, I'd like to turn to Federal Rule of Evidence 804(b).
Those of you who are federal judges or practice in federal court will surely find this
157.
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familiar business. Rule 804 is a series of hearsay exceptions, each of which requires
proof of the unavailability of the declarant, unlike Rule 803 exceptions, which don't
require any such proof. Subsection six provides that the following is not excluded
by the hearsay rule if the declarant is unavailable: "A statement offered against a
party that has engaged or acquiesced in wrongdoing, that was intended to and did
procure the unavailability of the declarant as a witness." '69 I will tell you that this
rule was enacted in 1997 and became effective December 1, 1997, so it has not been
a provision of the Federal Rules for very long.
Now, here's the quiz. Let's suppose that you are a federal judge presiding over
a federal criminal prosecution of a gentleman named Don Kingpin. Mr. Kingpin is
charged with various federal drug offenses and in his trial the government
introduces, as part of the evidence against Mr. Kingpin, an affidavit signed under
oath by one Jimmy Snitch. This affidavit describes Mr. Snitch's observation of
numerous episodes of drug dealing and other federal drug offenses by Mr. Kingpin.
Mr. Kingpin's lawyer is immediately on his feet objecting to this affidavit. You
know how it goes. He won't just say, "Hearsay, hearsay." He'll say, "It's the worst
kind of hearsay, Your Honor." The prosecution offers to prove to the satisfaction of
the court that (a) Mr. Snitch is unavailable and (b) the reason he's unavailable is that
his unavailability was procured by Mr. Kingpin.
So, you're the judge, you look up the rule and you realize this is a question of
admissibility governed by the standard of Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a).'70 You
excuse the jury, which is displaying a rather alarming curiosity about these
allegations. You hold a hearing outside the presence of the jury, and you are
satisfied by a preponderance of the evidence, which is all that it takes, that as a
matter of fact Mr. Kingpin procured the unavailability of Mr. Snitch. You make
such a finding on the record and you say to Kingpin's lawyer, "I overrule the
hearsay objection. Do you have any other objection?" At which time he says, "Of
course, yes, Your Honor. The admission of this evidence would violate my client's
rights under the Confrontation Clause."
The question is, How do you rule? Don't I wish I had a seating chart, so I'd know
who to call on.
DISCUSSION OF HYPOTHETICAL FROM SESSION ONE
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Well, I don't think it would be a firmly rooted
exception.
WESSON: What is it you think makes an exception firmly rooted? From the
Court's decisions, whether an exception is firmly rooted has something to do with
longevity.17 1 The Court also uses some language suggesting the firmly rooted
exceptions are the exceptions that have been historically shown to guarantee the
reliability of the statement, 7 ' although I myself don't think that's true at all. I can
think of many hearsay exceptions-for example, the exception for admissions of a
169. FED. R. EviD. 804(b)(6).
170. Federal Rule of Evidence 104(a) provides that preliminary questions concerning the qualification of a
person to be a witness, the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence are within the discretion of the
trial court, and that the moving party must establish admissibility by a preponderance of the evidence.
171. E.g, Lilly, 527 U.S. at 126.
172. Id.
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party opponentM-that don't rest on the proven reliability of such a statement, but
on a very different justification for admissibility. In any event, it does seem that
since we've only had this rule since 1997, it hasn't really stood the test of time yet.
Is there any reason to think that the affidavit given by Jimmy Snitch is particularly
reliable?
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Is he under oath?
WESSON: Is he under oath? Yes. Do you think that's enough?
MALE AUDIENCE MEMBER: Well, I don't know, but that's one factor.
MICHAEL KATZ: 74 In my experience, some clients who want to cooperate with
the government make all kind of statements in the privacy of the U.S. Attorney's
office. To me the failure of that witness to appear-whether or not the defendant on
trial engaged in some conduct that encouraged or helped him not appear-that
would be an indication to me that this is not a reliable statement. In other words,
they don't want to come to court and have to back it up for whatever reason, either
they are afraid of some consequences or something else. So I see some distinction
between cases where the defendant did something to a person that caused them not
to be able to be there as opposed to a witness simply deciding that he doesn't want
to be there and taking some money from the person on trial not to be there.
WESSON: I think so. It sounds, Mike, as though you're saying there are different
ways of procuring the unavailability of a witness.
KATZ: A lot of my cooperating, informing clients would like to be unavailable
at trial and just satisfy the government in the pretrial stage by giving a statement and
implicating everybody in the world and getting the hell out.
WESSON: Well, that might be sort of an uphill argument if you're making it
before a judge who has already found by a preponderance of the evidence that your
client procured the unavailability of the witness.
KATZ: But I'm saying there's another part of procuring, which is, what was the
witness's willingness or role in not being available? My client has some
wrongdoing, either he made the threat or paid somebody or arranged some
transportation. But did that unavailable witness go along with that in some way?
WESSON: Those are all good arguments, but wouldn't you be making those at
the hearing when you're trying to persuade the judge not to make the procurement
finding? It sounds to me like those are arguments that you've already made and lost
if the judge has already made the procurement finding, but maybe you could try to
resurrect them again at this setting. You are making me think in a way I haven't
before about the subtlety of the term procurement. You know, it's one thing to give
a guy a pair of concrete shoes, and it's another thing to give him a few dollars and
persuade him it's in his best interest to take a long vacation in Tahiti.
Well, I don't want to take up all of our time because I know some of you might
have comments about the other amendments as well. But thanks.
BERGMAN: Does anyone have any questions, issues, or comments?

173. FED. R. EviD. 801(d)(2).
174. Federal Public Defender, Denver, Colo.
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QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS, SESSION ONE
JUDGE TERRY KERN:' In that last case we were just discussing the
cooperation of witnesses. I have an even better example. There were two guys that
committed the crime; one pled guilty, and under his plea agreement his obligation
is to testify against the other guy. They brought him up from prison, put him in the
same cell as the guy he's supposed to testify against the following Monday, leaving
them there all weekend and suddenly on Monday he no longer wants to testify. He
refused to testify, attempted to take the Fifth Amendment, and I found him in
contempt about the whole thing. But in his grand jury testimony, under oath, he
corroborated aspects of physical evidence that it seemed no one else could, unless
they had been there with the defendant.
WESSON: That very argument was made by the state in Lilly-that the younger
Lilly's statement was reliable because it was corroborated by the discovery of
certain pieces of physical evidence exactly where he said they could find them. The
Court said, very interestingly, that corroboration is not the same thing as reliability
and that simply because an out-of-court statement is corroborated by tons of other
evidence, that doesn't mean that the statement is reliable. 76 The Court said we're
talking about intrinsic reliability, that is, something about the features of the
statement itself, the circumstances under which it was given, that makes it
intrinsically reliable, not just the prospect that it might have been corroborated by
other external or extrinsic circumstances. 77 In saying that, the Court was really
78
harking back to a case it decided about ten years earlier called Idaho v. Wright.
In Wright, the out-of-court statement was made by a child victim of sexual abuse,
and the statement was admitted under the Idaho portion of the catchall exception,
or the residual exception to the hearsay rule.'7 9 The defendant was convicted, and
the conviction got to the Supreme Court. The Court said the residual exception is not
a firmly rooted exception of the hearsay rule. 80° So Idaho argued that this child's
statement should be admissible because it was so strongly corroborated by other
things, including statements of another child who had experienced exactly the same
kind of sexual abuse imposed by the same defendant.' 8 ' But the Court said
corroboration is not the same thing as reliability." 2
KERN: Of course in my case the prior testimony was made under oath in front
of a grand jury.
WESSON: Apart from former testimony where a defendant has an opportunity
to cross-examine, it's hard to think of anything that seems more trustworthy than
testimony before a grand jury under oath. But I don't think that would be enough for
175. Chief District Judge, United States District Court, District of Oklahoma.
176. Lilly, 527 U.S. at 137.
177. Id. at 138.
178. Idaho v. Wright, 497 U.S. 805 (1990).
179. Id at 811-12. The trial court applied Idaho Rule of Evidence 803(24), which states, "A statement not
specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions but having equivalent circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness, if the court determines that (A) the statement is offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the
statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence which the proponent can
procure through reasonable efforts; and (C) the general purpose of these rules and the interests ofjustice will be best
served by admission of the statement into evidence."
180. Wright, 497 at 817.

181. Id. at 822.
182. Id. at 822-23.
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the Court. I don't think that would be enough even if it were coupled with
corroboration, frankly. I've never been clear in my mind why the Court is so hostile
to the idea that corroboration could be some kind of substitute for intrinsic indicia
of reliability. But the Court twice now has very clearly held that it is not.
.KATZ: Well in [Judge Kern's] case, it almost looks like the government procured
the unavailability of the witness by putting him in the cell with that other guy. I
mean, surely they had some responsibility to take care of their witnesses and if they
don't then they should suffer the consequences.
JUDGE ROBERT MURPHY: 3 It seems, in general, the defendant's strongest
argument is the right of confrontation, right to cross-examination, right to have the
person be there live in front of the jury and to ask those questions. That's what I
think the defendant argues.
WESSON: Yes, it is. But it's sort of mysterious, because in many cases of
hearsay there really is no opportunity for cross-examination at all.
MURPHY: That's right.
business records,"s5 public
WESSON: I mean, with excited utterances,'
records,' there's really no opportunity for cross-examination at all. Sometimes the
Court describes cross-examination as "the greatest engine ever invented for the
discovery of truth."'8 7 The Court uses that phrase again in Lilly. 8 But they are
remarkably willing to dispense with the right to cross-examination in the case of
some forms of hearsay. Excited utterances, for example, tend to be among the least
reliable kinds of utterances known to humankind. But the Court is enamored of this
idea that the inventors of the traditional, "firmly rooted" exceptions to the hearsay
rule really knew what they were doing.
AUDIENCE MEMBER: Is there anything left of § 3501?
LEFRANCOIS: I think nothing is left of § 3501, although we still have the
voluntariness test. Even if the Miranda warnings are given to somebody, we may
still have to decide whether or not a confession was really voluntary in order to meet
due process or to satisfy the Fifth Amendment. But I think there's nothing at all left
of § 3501. I think it's the dead letter that it's always been.
WESSON: Art, what do you think of the argument I've been reading in e-mail
lately that defendants are really better off under the voluntary standard than under
a Miranda regime, and that all this kind of energy that the defense bar has poured
into the resurrection of Miranda has been misdirected?
LEFRANCOIS: I agree with that. I was going to address that more in my
remarks. I think the only political attacks on Miranda that are of any merit have
been liberal attacks. Because lots of folks out there, particularly kind of "left" folks,
think that we would have a better system without something like Miranda.Whether
it's the voluntariness test, I don't know, but I think people could create a regime that
is a bit more Fifth Amendment protective. There's something very cute and easy
about Miranda. You read a card; presumptively we believe that the card is read,
183.
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even if it's not, I'm not sure that people who have the card read to them think, "Now
here's an officer who respects my Fifth Amendment rights."
WESSON: Do you think it's true, or maybe we could ask the judges in the
audience, that judges are less likely to look really hard at the voluntariness of a
statement once they satisfy themselves that Miranda was complied with?
LEFRANCOIS: I think that's right. Justice Rehnquist makes that point himself
in Dickerson. He says that, as a matter of reality, you have a voluntariness problem
even when the police have given the Mirandawarnings.' 89 It's really difficult to find
cases where a judge has been willing to find involuntariness when the warnings
were apparently given.
MURPHY: We rarely see any cases where the warnings weren't given.
JUDGE WILEY DANIEL:' 90 I have a question for Professor Wesson. Explain,
from your perspective, the difference between your analogy to a full co-conspirator
analysis of the Confrontation Clause and the connection, if any, between what
you're talking about and the admissibility consideration of co-conspirator
statements.
WESSON: Well, the courts seemed to be saying in the 1980s that to satisfy the
Confrontation Clause, you would have to prove not only the reliability of the out-ofcourt statement, but also the necessity for using an out-of-court statement instead of
live, in-court testimony. This usually meant proving unavailability. So for a while
I thought the prosecution would always have to prove the unavailability of the
declarant to use any hearsay exception, whether it's Rule 803 or 804, because
otherwise how can you satisfy the necessity prong of the test?
But there was a case in 1986 called United States v. Inadi,'91 in which the
Supreme Court heard the argument that use of the co-conspirator exception to the
hearsay rule, which does not require any proof of the unavailability of the out-ofcourt declarant, violated the Confrontation Clause."9 The Court held that it did not
and in the process discarded altogether what I had thought was an important prong
of the Confrontation Clause test-proving the necessity of using the hearsay, or the
unavailability of the declarant.' 93 So I don't think we're going to see very many
successful challenges under the Confrontation Clause to the use of co-conspirator
statements. Defendants are pretty much relegated to arguing about whether the
statement really complies with the terms of the exception itself.
VICKY MANDELL-KING:1 94 I just have a comment on the Bond case, Barb.
The Tenth Circuit came out right on that. 95 So we should be really proud of our
Circuit. It didn't get reversed.
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WESSON: It's all since the advent of soft-sided luggage, right? You wouldn't
have seen this case twenty years ago, because we all had those hard suitcases.
KATZ: I'm surprised the Supreme Court wanted to grant certiorari on City of
Indianapolisv. Edmond. It doesn't seem like it's outrageous.
BERGMAN: There was a split in the circuits on that one, so it was one I think the
Court clearly wanted to resolve. It's also one that I think presents an interesting
issue. How do we distinguish these regulatory sobriety checkpoints from what was
going on here? Is there a bright line we're going to draw?
WESSON: Don't you think there's an interesting tension between opposition to
the kind of intrusion of these drug checkpoints and concerns about racial profiling?
BERGMAN: Absolutely. It's interesting because in Wardlow, Justice Stevens,
in his separate opinion,"g was talking about the targeting of minorities and racial
profiling on the New Jersey Turnpike. He mentioned that a lot of police departments
have more presence in high crime areas, which tend often to be minority
neighborhoods, and that they tend to pull over people who are minorities more
often. 97 Minorities simply are more often the targets of these investigatory
procedures. Justice Stevens also noted his concern that there are all kinds of reasons
that people would take off when they see police officers, particularly when they see
these investigatory caravans and a lot of times they have reasons for not wanting to
be stopped by police, unrelated to criminal activity.'9 8 I hope that courts will be
sensitive to this concern about the impact of police investigatory tactics on
minorities.
QUESTIONS AND COMMENTS, SESSION TWO
The question and answer session began with a discussion of Professor Wesson' s
hypothetical.
WESSON: Ms. Sloan, a former student of mine, a terrific student, how would you
rule?
MARJORIE SLOAN:'99 I believe you're right; it does satisfy the hearsay rule, but
there are confrontational problems. There's no opportunity to cross-examine on the
information provided.
WESSON: So do you think that absence of an opportunity for cross-examination
always means a confrontation violation? Does that mean that the prosecution can
never use hearsay as part of its case against a defendant? Mr. Webber, what do you
think?
DANIEL WEBBER:2m It's not firmly rooted, nor has there been showing of
reliability.
WESSON: Okay, not firmly rooted. Why?
WEBBER: Because it's fairly new.
WESSON: In Lilly, the Court doesn't say exactly what it means by firmly rooted,
but it does suggest that it would be important that they've only had this rule for a
very short time.
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DEAN MARTIN BELSKY:2 ° I disagree with all the other people. I think the
Court would uphold it. The Lilly decision talked about the historic problem with
accomplice testimony-the problem of an accomplice saying bad things about
another accomplice and trying to get himself a good break against the other one. At
this point, even if you had the situation where it is the individual on trial who has
caused the absence of the witness, I think the reliability problem is still there. But,
you have to balance that against the need to provide information and evidence
against an individual. There are public policy issues here. You just heard Art talk
about the policy exception of Miranda.Otherwise you would keep an open door to
any kind of situation, whether it is organized crime or not, where the defendant is
trying to get rid of the witness before the time of trial. So I think the Court would
probably say it's okay.
WESSON: Well, the reason the Court had that lengthy discussion about
accomplice testimony is because they were suggesting it was unreliable, right?
There are reasons to doubt the reliability of a statement given by someone who
confesses to complicity in a crime but tends to push most of the responsibility off
on someone else. But you really think that an affidavit given by a guy named Jimmy
Snitch, who later disappears, is particularly reliable?
BELSKY: I'm not saying it's particularly reliable, but its reliability is enhanced
by the fact that they tried to knock this guy off. Plus, you have to consider the public
policy issues. I don't think this Court would say we are going to promote a situation
where you can knock off your key witnesses. I just don't think that's going to
happen.
PROFESSOR WESSON: Someone in the last session made a similar argument,
and I thought it was kind of brilliant. There's also an argument that the witness
waived his confrontation right by procuring the absence of the witness. I'm not so
sure about that. When the Court talks about waiver of constitutional rights, it always
says the standard for measuring the validity of a waiver of constitutional rights has
to be that it was knowing and intelligent.' There's no particular reason to think that
this guy, Don Kingpin, however bad a thing it is to bump off a witness, understood
that by doing that he was waiving his confrontation rights. Mr. Connelly?
SEAN CONNELLY: 20 3 I'm an assistant U.S. attorney. There's an opinion by
Judge Lucero in the last couple of months called United States v. Cherry.'0 That
5
which they upheld this
was a two-to-one decision-Judge Holloway dissented° '-in
[type of ruling] and applied a Pinkerton" analysis. They said that not only do you
have to be Joe Kingpin in your hypothetical, but if Joe Kingpin killed the witness
as part of a conspiracy, he is liable under Pinkerton analysis for waiver by
wrongdoing. I would not analyze this in terms of reliability, but rather on forfeiture
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and waiver. In other words, by engaging in that kind of wrongdoing, and
intentionally engaging in wrongdoing, you have waived your confrontation rights,
just like you could waive your right to be present in a courtroom by disruptive
behavior and waive other constitutional rights, not necessarily under knowing and
voluntary waiver, as you would for Miranda rights, simply by engaging in
misconduct that is not conducive to the trial process. I think Judge Lucero's opinion
is the leading case, certainly in this circuit, and probably the first case really
interpreting this rule.
WESSON: So, the opinion addresses the confrontation question?
CONNELLY: Yes, it addresses the issue of whether Pinkerton analysis applies
or whether it has to be personal wrongdoing and determines that a co-conspirator's
wrongdoing can be attributed to the actual defendant. But also the opinion goes on
to address the Confrontation Clause, and I think applies some Supreme Court cases
on waiver by misconduct, not precisely on this set of facts, but in other contexts, like
disruptive behavior, or waiving your right to be present in the courtroom. It certainly
is a legitimate issue. Judge Holloway did dissent.
WESSON: Judge Murphy?
JUDGE MICHAEL MURPHY: 2 7 1 was vote number two in that panel, and I say
this in fairness to all the other commoners here today, and that is that Mr. Connelly
is prepared for this panel because he argued that case in front of us.
WESSON: Were you successful, Mr. Connelly?
CONNELLY: It was an interlocutory appeal. Judge [Frank] Seay out of Eastern
Oklahoma suppressed the evidence. It was a pretrial motion in limine offered
affirmatively by the prosecution, saying let us have this [evidence]. Judge Seay said
no, that's not a proper interpretation; there would be a Confrontation Clause issue.
Or he relied on some precedent from before Rule 804(b)(6).
WESSON: Let me ask you this, Judge Murphy, because you voted on that case.
Were you troubled at all by the fact that the trial judge can make this finding by a
mere preponderance of the evidence? He can just find it only slightly more likely
than not that there was procurement of unavailability of this witness, and yet on this
basis he can remove what would otherwise be the confrontation rights of the
accused?
MURPHY: The problem is that to answer that question, I'd have to disclose
confidential information about the case.
BELSKY: All the suppression issues, whether it's Miranda, whether it's
Confrontation, are all by preponderance of the evidence.
WESSON: I understand what you're saying. It's just that your argument-the
argument that you made earlier-relied so strongly on the importance of the public
policy of discouraging this sort of evil, vicious and twisted conduct of bumping off
witnesses, and it seemed to rest on a kind of a certainty that that's what happened.
Yet we're far from certain when we're using a preponderance standard administered
by a trial judge. I don't know the answer myself, certainly, and it will be interesting
to follow this Cherry case. I don't mean to take all of our time either. You probably
have questions about those other amendments.
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BELSKY: I have a question for Art, and I'd like to ask Barbara a question, also,
if I can. There's been a whole series of arguments that Miranda doesn't really
matter. Symbolically it matters, but most of the decisions on the Fifth Amendment
don't matter. That while we fight over Miranda,ninety-nine percent of the cases are
still the same. Whether they're saying the confession's voluntary or there was a
knowing and intelligent waiver, on the street it doesn't really matter, it's exactly the
same issue. So it's become the symbolic issue. Similarly in the search and seizure
cases, the Court has widened every once in a while only when something outrageous
occurs, like going after a person because they're black, or going for someone's
luggage. You used the airplane analogy well, because they weren't worried about
the bus station situation. They were worried about upper middle class people on an
airplane. The Court seems only concerned in outrageous situations like that, so that
the Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Amendments have become symbolic. In the day-to-day
application, courts have given broad leeway to the trial judge, at the state or federal
level, to decide and uphold evidence. Any comments?
LEFRANCOIS: Marty, let me just respond to the Fifth Amendment aspect of
that. I've always been interested in the fact that the Supreme Court has been more
reluctant to carve out exceptions to Miranda'sexclusionary rule than it has been to
carve out exceptions to the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule, even though we
might have thought the Fourth Amendment exclusionary rule was about the Fourth
Amendment and the Mirandaexclusionary rule was not about the Fifth Amendment,
but instead about Miranda. Nevertheless, the Court has, in a sense, honored
Miranda more than it has the Fourth Amendment even though-well, maybe
because-the Court sort of made Miranda up.
I do think the most compelling criticisms of Mirandaare those from the left that
say that we might do something a bit more effective. We might do something more
protective of Fifth Amendment interests if we didn't simply have this silly regime
where we all know what the little Mirandacard says before it's ever read. I suppose
the judges are inclined to believe that police officers, because it's a costless thing,
typically do read the Miranda card. Then you get an inquiry into voluntariness
anyway, the inquiry that we would have had before Miranda. So I certainly agree
with you that the monumental importance, if there is monumental importance, of
Miranda is absolutely in its iconic, symbolic value. It's an artifact of our national
culture.
BERGMAN: In terms of the Fourth Amendment, when I teach criminal
procedure, sometimes I tell my students that much of our course is a history course,
because we're going to be looking at what used to be the law in terms of Fourth
Amendment. I say that somewhat facetiously, but there have been so many
exceptions carved out, I think as your comment indicates, to the Fourth Amendment.
It is only truly the egregious cases where the Court draws the line. But it does draw
the line. There are still cases where the court says this goes too far. The Court did
that this term in both J.L and Bond. From a defense attorney's perspective-that
was my background-I am heartened by the fact that there is still a Fourth
Amendment, and there still are arguments that are persuasive to the Supreme Court.
We still do have substantial protections under the Fourth Amendment, though not
as many as I would like, but there are significant ones there.
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WESSON: Some of you may have seen in the New York Times an editorial by
Scott Turow2 8 about the symbolic importance of Miranda.2 9 I think it was really
good, because I've always sort of wondered to myself, Yes, it has symbolic
importance, but what does it symbolize? He's such a persuasive writer that even
though I'm not sure I really agree with him, I certainly did the minute I finished
reading his article. He said the symbolic importance of Miranda is twofold. First,
it symbolizes equality-that the poor, uneducated, ignorant, illiterate person has a
right to understand the same things about his rights as the person who always
understood them, even before getting a warning. Second, it symbolizes civilian
control-that it's not just the cops and the accused in the interrogation room.
Instead, at some point a civilian is going to look into the interrogation room and find
out what happened. Now, whether you really have to have Miranda in order to
uphold the values, I'm not sure. But certainly that was an eloquent explanation of
what it has come to symbolize.
LEFRANCOIS: Thank you all very much.
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